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Abstract
Using recently collected examination data from a sample of Texas state-chartered banks
over the period 1919-1926, the role of moral hazard in increasing ex-ante asset risk is analyzed. 
During this period, a state-run deposit insurance system was in place that was mandatory for all
state-chartered banks in Texas.  Nationally chartered banks were not allowed to participate in the
insurance program.  Analyzing individual bank-level data, we find evidence that declines in
capitalization were positively correlated with increases in loan concentrations at insured banks. 
We argue that this is consistent with a moral-hazard effect at work.  No such relationship is found
between capitalization and risk at uninsured banks.I.  Introduction
Interest in the impact of deposit insurance on bank activities revived during the banking
difficulties of the 1980s.  A number of analysts argued that insured banks are subject to moral
hazard.  Under an imprecisely-priced deposit insurance program, banks face an economic
incentive to pursue additional risks than they would otherwise undertake in the absence of deposit
guarantees.  Thus, it is argued that one source of the financial difficulties of the 1980s was the
existence of federal deposit insurance at banks and thrifts.  
That deposit insurance may affect a bank’s investment decisions has long been of concern
to observers of banking.  Opponents of government-sponsored deposit insurance in the early
1900s noted that insurance might serve as a subsidy from conservatively run banks to more
aggressive banks.  Despite these concerns, a number of states in the early 1900s adopted deposit
insurance systems.  In Texas, the state legislature of 1909 passed what was known as the
Meachum-Greer bill (or Senate Bill Number 4), which established a deposit insurance program for
all state-chartered banks.
Using data collected from bank examination reports from the 1920s, the experience of
Texas banks under the state deposit insurance program is investigated in an effort to explore the
role of insurance coverage in affecting the risk profile of banks.  The Texas experience is
especially interesting because the insurance program was mandatory for state banks, but national
banks were not allowed to join.  As such, nationally chartered banks can serve as a control group
in the empirical tests of whether deposit insurance encourages banks to pursue more risky
activities.  To our knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the moral-hazard issue using
individual bank data for a state insurance program in which participation was mandatory. 
Because we use newly-collected examination data on Texas banks beginning in 1919, we are able-2-
to provide a new data source for testing the view that deposit insurance has a significant impact
on banks’ investment decisions.
We find evidence consistent with moral-hazard incentives at work.  Specifically, state-
chartered banks, which were covered by the state’s deposit insurance system, pursued more risky
activities following declines in their capital positions.  We do not find such a relationship between
capital and asset risk for uninsured national banks.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II reviews the literature on moral hazard,
followed by a description of Texas banking in the early part of the century in Section III.  Section
IV describes the deposit insurance programs implemented by the state of Texas, followed by a
review of the new data on Texas banks in Section V.  The empirical model is presented in Section
VI, followed by a discussion of the results in Section VII and our conclusions in Section VIII.  
II.  Previous Evidence on Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard
The idea that deposit insurance affects a bank’s incentives is well established in economic
theory.  As Kareken and Wallace (1978) point out, a bank facing a fixed-rate deposit insurance
system has an incentive to take additional risks, an example of the moral-hazard problem. Merton
(1977) shows that by guaranteeing deposits, the insurer effectively has issued a put option on the
assets of insured institutions.  Deposit insurance gives the owners of an insured bank the right to
sell the firm’s assets to the insurer for the face value of deposits upon their effective maturity date,
or the date of the next regulatory examination.  The well-known comparative static properties of
the standard options-pricing model highlight the perverse incentives inherent in fixed-rate deposit
insurance systems -- the value of bank equity is maximized by increasing both leverage and asset-3-
risk (Smith, 1976 and Marcus, 1984).   Moreover, the gains to increasing asset risk rise as a bank
approaches insolvency.  
Declines in capital then enhance the value of the put option inherent in deposit insurance
and provide incentives for extra risk-taking.  Kane (1989) identifies the “zombie” problem in
which a financial institution with low capital has additional incentives to take on risk.  As shown
in Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981), and Marcus (1984), however, bank charter value can mitigate
the risk-taking incentives of deposit insurance.  If charter value is sufficiently large, value
maximization can dictate protection of the charter, and in this case, increases in leverage and asset
risk would reduce rather than enhance shareholder wealth.  
Although moral hazard is well defined theoretically, only a few studies have attempted to
estimate empirically the importance of this effect.  Barth and Bradley (1989) find that the behavior
of insolvent thrifts differed in some ways from their solvent counterparts.  Beginning in 1982,
mortgage assets, as a percent of total assets, declined at both solvent and insolvent institutions,
but the decline was more pronounced at insolvent thrifts.  Within the mortgage category itself,
however, insolvent institutions rapidly increased their commercial mortgage lending relative to
solvent thrifts, an area of lending generally associated with greater risk.  Overall though, Barth
and Bradley find little evidence that thrifts took significant advantage of new powers granted them
in the early 1980s.  
Keeley (1990) offers empirical support to the view that increased competition and the
concomitant decline in charter values exacerbated the moral-hazard problem among commercial
banks.  Gunther and Robinson (1991) find evidence of moral hazard in Texas banks during the
1980s.  Brewer and Mondschean (1994) look at the extent to which underpriced deposit-4-
insurance has distorted the risk/return tradeoff for thrift shareholders.  They find evidence that the
stock prices of thrifts with a high risk of failure reacted favorably to shifts from traditional
mortgage lending toward more volatile loans and investments, such as junk bonds.  
While these studies generally find evidence consistent with moral-hazard incentives at
work, it is not possible to know what choices banks would have made if they were not covered by
deposit insurance.  This issue arises in almost any study of present-day banking because almost all
banks are covered by FDIC insurance.  Thus, there is generally no control group without deposit
insurance which could be used to distinguish the effects of deposit insurance from other influences
on banks’ decision-making.
To overcome this control problem, a number of studies have relied on historical data on
banking when investigating moral hazard.  Individual states experimented with deposit insurance
many years before the federal government adopted it, and the experience of banks in these states
provides insights into the effects of deposit insurance.  Wheelock (1992), Wheelock and
Kumbhakar (1995), and  Wheelock and Wilson (1995), examine individual banks in Kansas that
participated in a state deposit insurance program in the 1920s, on a voluntary basis.  These studies
provide evidence that those banks which chose insurance coverage took additional risks.  
Using data aggregated at the state level, Calomiris (1990a, 1990b) finds that deposit
insurance in the early 1900s increased incentives for bank risk taking, with the effect being
stronger for states with mandatory insurance than for states with voluntary insurance.  Looking at
individual U.S. thrifts, Grossman (1992) determines that a thrift in the 1930s, when first admitted
to the voluntary federal insurance program, did not take more risks than an uninsured thrift.  But,
after several years, risk did increase.  In sum, these studies suggest that, based on individual bank-5-
       On a related issue, White (1981) finds that states with unit banking were more likely to
1
choose deposit insurance.
and thrift data, moral-hazard incentives exist for voluntary insurance programs, and based on
aggregated data, similar incentives exist for mandatory programs as well.
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To our knowledge, this paper is the first to use individual bank level data to examine an
insurance program which was mandatory.   Because Calomiris concludes from state-level data
that mandatory deposit insurance enhanced the moral-hazard problem, the evidence for moral
hazard should be stronger with the individual Texas bank data than for a state with a voluntary
program.  This paper builds on previous work estimating moral-hazard effects by incorporating
proxies for ex-ante measures of risk.  In particular, we are able to make use of two measures of
loan concentration that have not been available in previous studies -- the proportion of loans
secured by agriculture and the proportion secured by real estate.  Finally, this paper provides
additional evidence on moral hazard by examining individual bank behavior from a sample of
nationally chartered banks that were ineligible to participate in the state’s insurance system.  The
availability of these data, along with the structure of the Texas banking system in the early part of
the century, offer a unique opportunity to examine whether the existence of deposit insurance
heightened asset risk.
III.  A Brief History of Texas Banking 
Texas’ attitude towards banking was one of ambivalence, if not outright hostility.  At the
state’s constitutional convention, held in 1845, the following clause was adopted: “No corporate
body shall hereafter be created, renewed, or extended, with banking or discounting privileges” 
(Grant and Crum, 1978, p. 15).  Although nationally-chartered and private banks existed in Texas-6-
       Grant and Crum (1978) provides a more complete history of the state-chartered banking
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industry in Texas, and this section draws upon it.  For a comparison of state banks to national
banks in Texas, see Shirley and Nichols (1931).
       For state banks, the minimum capital needed ranged from $10,000 to $100,000, depending
3
on the population of the city.  For national banks, the requirement ranged from $25,000 to
$200,000, again depending on population.  In only one population category did the state
requirement equal the national requirement; elsewhere, the state requirement was lower than the
national bank requirement.  See White (1983) for a summary of capital requirements by state.
in the 1800s, the Texas legislature passed the Texas State Bank Law authorizing state-chartered
banks only in 1905.   A boom in state-chartered banking followed, and by 1910, there were a total
2
of 584 state banks in Texas.  Chart 1 shows that state banks quickly outgrew private banks in
terms of asset holdings.  However, nationally-chartered banks held the majority of the state’s
banking assets.  
In part, the rapid increase in the number of state banks was the result of relatively modest
requirements for establishing a state bank compared to a national bank.  Obtaining a state charter
required that the owners file an application with the Department of Insurance and Banking, but
did not require further investigation by the state before the charter was granted.  However, in
1913, the state legislature amended the law to require the state Commissioner of Banking and
Insurance to investigate potential bank owners and the local market before approving a charter,
thus effectively increasing the difficulty of obtaining a state charter.
The 1905 law also established a capital requirement for state-chartered banks which was
lower than the capital requirement for nationally-chartered banks.   As a result, the cost of
3
opening a bank fell, and small towns that previously had few or no banks saw an increase in the
number of state-chartered banks.  In 1913, the Federal Reserve Act required each state bank that-7-
became a member of the Federal Reserve System to meet the capital requirements for a national
bank, thus eradicating this advantage of a state charter for Federal Reserve member banks.
A state bank did have some flexibility in lending that a national bank did not have.  A state
bank could lend using real estate as collateral, as long as the bank did not lend more than 50
percent of its capital or more than 50 percent of the market value of the collateral.  A national
bank could lend on real estate only up to an amount equal to 25 percent of its capital.  Also, while
a national bank could lend only up to 10 percent of its capital to a single borrower, a state bank
could lend up to 25 percent of its capital to a single borrower.
Although the 1905 law encouraged the opening of new state banks, it also imposed a
number of restrictions.  One major regulation imposed was that shareholders of state banks faced
double liability on their shares.  Further, the law limited geographic expansion of a bank by
allowing only "unit banking," which prohibited both state and national banks from establishing
branches.  Several years later, state-chartered banks were also required to join the newly created
deposit insurance system.
IV.  The Texas Deposit Insurance Program
Concerns about bank stability following the panic of 1907 led, in 1909, to the creation of a
bank deposit insurance program organized by the Texas state government.  The Depositors
Guaranty Law mandated participation in the insurance program for all state-chartered banks in
Texas.  It also allowed national banks to participate on a voluntary basis.  However, the
Comptroller of the Currency had ruled in 1908 that national banks could not participate in state
deposit insurance programs, so national banks in Texas did not join the state system.  The-8-
      Robb (1921), Shibley (1914), and the FDIC Annual Report (1956) provide a comparison of
4
the Texas law to other contemporary laws.  Shibley includes a copy of the Texas law in an
appendix.
       None of the banks in our sample chose this form of deposit insurance.  
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insurance program became effective on January 1, 1910, and officially operated until February 11,
1927, although it experienced difficulties before 1927.
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In the Depositors Guaranty Fund, a state bank paid an insurance premium into an
insurance fund.  The initial assessment for a member of the Guaranty Fund equaled one percent of
the previous year's average demand deposits.  In the following years, the annual insurance
assessment was to be one-fourth of one percent of average demand deposits, or up to two percent
in an emergency.  A bank's assessment did not depend on the riskiness of its investments.  The
Guaranty Fund protected only non-interest-bearing deposits, but the amount of protection for
these deposits was unlimited.
A state bank could also obtain insurance through a program known as the Bond Security
System, in which a bank filed annually with the state a bond equal to the amount of its capital. 
The number of banks which chose this alternative was small, peaking in 1914 at 62 banks, or
seven percent of all state banks (Grant and Crum, 1978).   The proportion of banks in this
5
alternative program remained small because a bank was not allowed to switch from one insurance
program to the other until fairly late in the time period during which the Depositors Guaranty
Fund operated.
As noted above, all state-chartered banks were required to participate in the insurance
program, while no nationally-chartered banks were permitted to join.  State bankers actually
considered deposit insurance to be one of the main advantages of a state charter (Weaver, 1926). -9-
       Prior to the 1920s, the failure rate of Texas state and national banks remained below one
6
percent.
Although few state banks wished to avoid the insurance program, a bank could do so if it was
willing to convert to a national charter.  In the first year of the program's existence,  no state
banks chose this option, and very few did so through the mid-1920s.  This is likely the result of
several factors, mainly the perceived advantages to marketing a bank as insured, and the relatively
small cost of participating in the insurance program, which averaged only $50 annually in the
1910s (Weaver, 1926).  Another important factor was that state law made charter conversion
quite costly.  According to the law, a state bank could convert to a national charter only if it
liquidated completely and re-opened under a new national charter.  In 1923, the legislature
changed the law to allow a state bank to convert to a national charter without a complete
liquidation.  The number of conversions rose after this change, as noted below, but did not
constitute a large portion of banks in any of the remaining years of the Depositors Guaranty Fund. 
The Depositors Guaranty Law also mandated a relationship between bank size, in terms of
deposits, and bank capital.  In effect, the law established a capital-to-deposit ratio requirement,
somewhat like current U.S. capital-to-asset requirements.  A bank with $10,000 of capital initially
could acquire deposits equal to no more than five times its capital plus surplus.  The law allowed
progressively higher multiples of deposits relative to capital plus surplus, up to a maximum of ten
times capital plus surplus for a bank with capital greater than $100,000.
The early years of the Depositors Guaranty Fund were uneventful.  The 1910s were
relatively stable years for banks, and thus for the insurance program.   However, a downturn in
6-10-
economic activity in the early 1920s precipitated fairly widespread financial difficulties.  Table 1
shows bank liquidations in Texas from 1919 through 1926.  This time period coincides with the
availability of our examination data and with the operations of the Depositors Guaranty Fund. 
The liquidation rate began to increase fairly steadily for state-chartered banks in the early 1920s
before leveling off a bit.  However, liquidations then jumped to almost 17 percent in 1925. 
Except for 1921, the liquidation rate of Texas national banks was below their state-chartered
counterparts, sometimes by a fairly substantial margin.  These differences in liquidation rates
could reflect the impact of moral-hazard incentives at work at state-chartered banks.
The emerging banking difficulties of the 1920s began to strain the resources of the
Depositors Guaranty Fund.  Insurance assessments began to rise to meet increased demands on
the insurance fund associated with the costs of covering insured deposits in failed banks.  The
Depositors Guaranty Fund began to charge special assessments on banks, over and above its
regular assessments.  These special assessments were imposed on banks in order to replenish the
Depositors Guaranty Fund to its mandated $2 million.  Table 2 shows that total assessments for
all state banks climbed from less than one-tenth of one percent of total assets in 1919, to a peak of
1.68 percent of total assets in 1921.  For the state banks in our sample, their assessment burden
was initially less than the entire population of state banks until 1922.  Insurance assessments
peaked for our sample of state-chartered banks at 2.09 percent of assets in 1925. 
As the cost of membership rose, some state banks decided to leave the program by
converting their state charters to national charters, especially after 1923, when new state laws
made conversion less costly than before.  Thus began the erosion of the insurance program. -11-
       Over the period 1908-1917, seven other states -- Oklahoma, Nebraska, Minnesota, North
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Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, and Washington -- also implemented various types of deposit
insurance systems, all of which suffered the same fate as the Texas system.  See American
Bankers Association (1933), Calomiris (1989), and Wheelock (1992).
Grant and Crum (1978, p. 49) report only a few conversions in 1924, and  80 conversions, or
about ten percent of total state banks, in 1925. 
The deposit insurance system deteriorated further in 1926, after the state legislature
amended the law to allow a bank to move between the Depositors Guaranty Fund and the Bond
Security System, discussed above.  A mass exodus to the Bond Security System followed.  This,
of course, left the Depositors Guaranty Fund in an even more precarious situation, as it had fewer
banks on which to levy assessments.  A bank failure in September 1926 ultimately pushed the
Depositors Guaranty Fund into insolvency.  As a result, the state legislature repealed the
Depositors Guaranty Law in February 1927, effectively ending Texas’ experiment with deposit
insurance.
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Despite its ultimate demise, the existence of a deposit insurance program for state-
chartered banks gives rise to the possibility that moral-hazard incentives contributed to the
banking difficulties experienced in Texas during the 1920s.  The recent collection of examination
reports for a number of state-chartered banks in Texas over the period during which the
Depositors Guaranty Fund was in operation provides us with an opportunity to add to the existing
empirical literature on the role of moral hazard in increasing banks’ risk.
V.  New Data on Texas Banks 1919-1926
The empirical work uses newly collected data from Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Examiner’s Report of Condition.  Along with basic balance sheet information, these examiners’-12-
       A random sample was necessitated due to the resource constraints encountered in collecting,
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tabulating, and entering the data from the examination records.
reports include annual data on a bank’s loan portfolio categorized by type of collateral used.  A
random sample of 89 banks out of approximately 200 available banks comprises our data set.  
8
These data represent an unbalanced panel data set because not all banks appear in each year.  As
Table 3 shows, the sample observations per year capture one-quarter to almost one-half of all
state member banks examined by the Federal Reserve in that year, with the sample banks' assets
equal to between 10 and 20 percent of total state member bank assets by year.
While these new data provide an interesting data base for a period in which little
information on individual banks is available, they do have a number of limitations.  First, the
examinations were not regularly scheduled at the same time each year, so the time interval
between panel observations is not constant.  Second, the available archival records indicate that
some examination reports have been destroyed, so the sample chosen from existing reports is not
a sample drawn from the original population.  We are also not able to determine which, if any, of
these banks failed.  In fact, we have been unable to determine why these examination records even
survived.  Thus, it is important to acknowledge that these factors might drive some of the
empirical results reported.
To complement the data on state-chartered banking, and to provide a control group, data
were also collected from basic balance sheet information on nationally chartered banks in Texas. 
These banks were not covered under any deposit insurance system and would not be expected to
exhibit any moral-hazard effects.  This data set uses balance sheet information drawn from reports
of condition from a random sample of 50 out of approximately 500 nationally chartered Texas-13-
       These data are published in Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency from 1919-
9
1926.
banks that were in existence in 1919.    The reporting dates of the national bank reports are the
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same in a given year for each bank, but at times differ slightly across years.  As Table 4 shows, the
national bank sample by year equals between 6 and 9 percent of the total number of national
banks in Texas with between 10 and 22 percent of total national bank assets in the state.
Finally, Table 5 compares summary statistics for our sample of state and national banks to
the population of state and national banks in Texas over the period 1919-1926, when the
insurance program was in operation.  The typical state-chartered bank in the sample recorded a
capital-to-asset ratio of 19 percent, with over 60 percent of its assets in loans.  These figures are
slightly below those for the average of all state banks in Texas.  The size of the average state bank
in our sample equals almost $500,000 in total assets, slightly larger than the average of all state
banks in Texas.  On average, the national banks in our sample were better capitalized than all
Texas national banks, but were less-well-capitalized compared to state banks.  The loan-to-asset
ratio for our sample of national banks is identical to the Texas national bank population, and
slightly below the comparable numbers for state banks.  The average national bank in our sample
recorded total assets equal to $2.5 million, and is thus significantly larger than the average state
bank, and larger than the average size of all Texas national banks.  From these comparisons, the
sample observations used in our empirical estimations of moral-hazard effects appear to be
reasonable representations of the populations from which they were drawn.-14-
VI.  The Empirical Model
Subjecting the theory of moral hazard to empirical testing is far from straightforward. 
Perhaps the biggest difficulty is quantifying shifts in banks’ ex-ante risk-taking.  While rapid asset
growth is sometimes associated with higher risk, the structure of a bank’s assets, measured by
loan concentrations, can be a good proxy for risk.  Historically, the loan-to-asset ratio has tended
to move procyclically.  Banks are more willing to extend credit during an upswing in economic
activity and retrench their lending during downturns.  A higher proportion of loans leaves a bank
more exposed to credit risk and more vulnerable to an adverse economic shock.  Using other
measures of risk, such as the troubled asset ratio or the proportion of nonperforming loans in
banks’ portfolios, would seem less desirable.  These are ex-post measures of risk that could reflect
factors other than managerial choice, such as a downturn in economic activity.  Moreover, if some
banks chose to pursue more risky activities as capital declined, and these ventures proved
successful, then they would not be captured by ex-post measures of risk.
To estimate whether moral-hazard incentives were present, we test whether asset risk, as
proxied by various loan concentrations, is related to prior capitalization levels among a sample of
insured Texas banks operating during the 1920s.  Consistent with the theoretical models of
Merton (1977), Marcus (1984), and Keeley (1990), we hypothesize that those banks with declines
in capital would be the ones most prone to exploit a deposit insurance subsidy and take on added
risk.  The concentration of assets in loans and the concentration of loans in selected categories
serve as our proxies for ex-ante asset risk.  If declines in the capital position of banks are
associated with subsequent increases in loan concentration, then this would provide evidence
consistent with a moral-hazard effect at work.    -15-
       While bank examination data are available through the early 1930s, we confine our empirical
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analysis to the time period 1919-1926 to coincide with the operation of the Depositors Guarantee
Fund.
       Comparable data on loan concentration categories are not available for national banks. 
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Some state-chartered banks also reported loans secured by stocks and bonds, but these loans
represented relatively small components of total loans for these banks.
       See the appendix for a complete description of the variables used.
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Chart 2 shows the distribution of average total loans over the time period 1919-1926 for
our sample of state and national banks.   While some state and national banks recorded fairly
10
large loan concentrations, the state-chartered (insured) banks consistently exhibited larger loan to
asset ratios.  As stated above, a unique aspect of our data on state-chartered banks is the
availability of loan concentrations based on the type of collateral used to secure the loan.  Higher
proportions of particular loan categories might be superior measures of ex-ante risk if they reflect
a reluctance to diversify asset portfolios.  This risk could presumably be reduced by altering
portfolio compositions toward, say, greater holdings of government securities.  Chart 3 shows the
distribution of the average amount of both agricultural loans and loans secured by real estate for
Texas state banks.  Agricultural loans were much more important than real estate loans, and some
of the banks in our sample exhibited, on average, fairly large loan exposures to this particular type
of credit.   
11
But, while loan exposure was high at some of these banks, the moral-hazard effect would
suggest that these loan concentrations might be negatively related to financial strength, as
measured by capital.  In an effort to determine if  loan concentrations were negatively related to
prior financial strength, we estimate the following model :
12-16-
       We also try three explicit measures of economic activity in the regressions.  First, we used
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annual cotton production quantities, in bales, by county.  Cotton was the major crop in Texas
during the sample period.  According to The Texas Almanac (1931), Texas led the U.S. in cotton
production each year in the sample, producing on average about one-third of the total U.S. crop. 
The annual value of the cotton crop in Texas during this period ranged between 44 and 63 percent
of the value of all Texas crops, and approximately half of all Texas land devoted to crops was
planted in cotton.  Second, we used the annual number of building permits issued in five regions
of the state, and then the dollar value of permits issued.  These measures were intended  to
capture some of the non-agricultural activity which cotton production misses.  Cotton data were
obtained from The Texas Almanac (1933), and data on permits and their value were obtained
from various issues of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas’ Monthly Review of Business and
Industrial Conditions, 1920-1927.  However, these variables were not statistically significant in
any of the models estimated.
LOANASS = $  + $ *CAPASS  + $ *LOANASS  +  (1) i,t 0 1 i,t-1 2 i,t-1
$  *SIZE  + $  *ECONOMY + , , 3 i,t 4 t i,t
where LOANASS  is the loan to asset ratio for bank i at time t, and CAPASS is the (lagged) i,t i,t-1 
capital to asset ratio for bank i.  If a moral-hazard effect is related to prior capitalization levels,
then the expected sign on $  is negative.  The lagged loan concentration term is included to allow 1
for a partial-adjustment process in lending activity.   SIZE  is the log of a bank’s assets, and is i,t
intended to control for bank size, which might be important given that the uninsured banks were
larger institutions. To control for changes in economic activity, we use ECONOMY, which t
represents a vector of annual dummy variables, while ,  is an error term.   Our data allow us to i,t
13
use several definitions for the dependent variable, including total loans (LOANASS), agricultural
loans (AGLOANS), and loans secured by real estate (RELOANS).  Before estimating the
empirical model, we first offer some evidence on the efficacy of these proxies for ex-ante risk.-17-
       The coefficients on the annual dummy variables are not shown, but they were jointly
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significant.  In addition, because the data on state bank examinations are for different times during
the year, and because agricultural loans are such an important component of the state banks’ asset
structure (see Chart 3), the models are also estimated using quarterly dummy variables in an
attempt to capture the seasonal nature of agricultural lending activity.  These quarterly dummy
variables, while not shown, were also statistically significant in all of the models estimated.
VII.  The Results
VII.  A.  Loan Concentrations as Measures of Ex-Ante Risk
To be desirable proxies for ex-ante bank risk, loan concentrations should be positively
related to the likelihood of failure.  As stated above, however, we are unable to determine which,
if any, of these banks failed.  Instead, we examine the statistical significance of a bank’s loan
concentrations in explaining its subsequent troubled asset ratio (TROUBLED) by estimating the
following equation:
TROUBLED  = " " *LOANASS  + " *SIZE  * " *ECONOMY + . (2) i,t 0 +  1 i,t-1 2 i,t 3 t i,t.
If prior loan concentrations are statistically significant in explaining troubled assets, after
accounting for size and economic activity, then this would support using loan concentrations as
measures of ex-ante risk.  The results from estimating equation (2) using the different measures of
loan concentrations are found in Table 6.  The coefficients on past values of LOANASS,
AGLOANS, and RELOANS are all positive and statistically significant.  To the extent that those
banks with higher proportions of troubled assets are more likely to fail, these results indicate that
measures of loan concentration might be useful proxies for ex-ante risk.  
14
VII.  B.  Risk at Insured Banks
In an effort to detect if moral-hazard incentives increased banks’ ex-ante risk, the
empirical model given by equation (1) is estimated, with the results in Table 7.  For our sample of-18-
       Two possible sources of endogeneity in this model are choice of charter and bank capital
15
levels.  As noted in Section IV, state banks converted to national charters very infrequently during
our sample period because it was very costly.  Therefore, selectivity bias would appear to be
small.  For capital, the model attempts to control for endogeneity by using the previous period's
capital level.  Such a predetermined variable would not be expected to show endogeneity.  Thus,
we believe endogeneity is unlikely in our model.
       Again, annual dummy variables are used to account for economic activity and quarterly
16
dummy variables to account for the seasonal nature of agricultural lending.  While not shown,
these dummy variables are statistically significant in all of the models estimated.
Texas state-chartered banks, the model is estimated using first total loans as the dependent
variable, and then using agricultural loans and real estate loans, all expressed as a percent of
assets.   The results in the second column of Table 5 use total loans as a percent of assets as the
15
dependent variable and provide evidence consistent with a moral-hazard effect at work.   The
16
coefficient on the capitalization variable is negative and significant, indicating that prior declines in
capitalization give rise to greater asset risk, as measured by loan concentration.  The coefficient
on the lagged dependent variable and on bank size are also statistically significant.  
The third column of Table 7 uses the ratio of agricultural loans to assets as the dependent
variable.  Again, results consistent with a moral-hazard effect are indicated by the negative and
significant (at the ten-percent level) coefficient on the capitalization term.  Finally, the results from
using real estate loans are shown in the fourth column of Table 7.  Here, the model does poorly. 
Only the lagged dependent variable is statistically significant.  The poor results from using the
concentration of real estate loans could reflect the relatively unimportant role real estate lending
played for our sample of state-chartered banks, as revealed in Chart 3. -19-
       To judge the robustness of the results, several alternate specifications were also estimated. 
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First, the examination reports for the state-chartered banks indicate that, for some of the banks, 
the exams took place during different time periods over the years.  To judge what effect this
unequal spacing of observations might have on the results, for each bank we created a variable
called MONTHS, which measures the number of months between examinations.  We then
interacted MONTHS with the lagged variables in our model, CAPASS  and LOANASS , in an t-1 t-1
attempt to judge whether these estimates are affected by irregular exam dates.  These interaction
terms were statistically insignificant, providing some evidence that the irregular nature of the
exam data did not affect our results.  We also used MONTHS interacted with the lagged loan
concentrations when estimating equation (1).  Again, these interaction terms were not statistically
significant. 
       We also estimated the model with an interaction term defined as CAPASS *LOANASS ,
18
t-1 t-1
which is intended to capture the possibility of both liquidity and regulatory influences on bank
lending activity.  These factors might be expected to mitigate the effect of changes in
capitalization on lending activity.  Those banks that already have a high amount of loan exposure
might only be able to increase lending further only when capitalization increases due either to
liquidity constraints or regulatory actions.  The expected sign on the coefficient of this interaction
term is thus positive.  However, in the models estimated, this interaction term was statistically
insignificant.  We also estimated the various models using only those banks with five or more
examination records to judge whether the frequency of examinations might affect the results.  The
same qualitative results found in Table 7 were obtained when limiting the sample to those banks
with five or more examination records.  
Overall, the results from these estimations provide some evidence that declines in
capitalization led to increases in asset risk, as measured by loan concentrations.   Such activity on
17
the part of insured banks would indicate that banks with weakened financial conditions increased
the riskiness of their asset portfolios, which would be consistent with a moral-hazard effect at
work.
18
VII. C.  Risk at Uninsured Banks
To provide further evidence on the role of moral hazard in increasing risk, we also
estimated the empirical model using balance sheet data for nationally chartered banks in Texas
over the same time period.  These banks were not allowed to join the state insurance program,
and thus their deposits were not covered by any guarantees.  As such, these banks offer a control-20-
       Moreover, because the state insurance program was mandatory, and switching charters was
19
relatively expensive, the adverse selection problem discussed in Wheelock (1992) and Grossman
(1992) should not be very important.
       The state banks in our sample operated in 53 different counties across Texas.  The national
20
banks in our sample also operated in about one-fourth of these counties.  National banks tended
to operate in larger counties.  Using data from the 1920 census, the average market size (judged
by county population) was 38,009 for national banks and 25,530 for state banks.  The median
values were 25,456 and 18,080, respectively.  Therefore, in an attempt to control for possible
differences in market areas due to location, we also estimated equation (1) using both the cotton
and permits variables discussed in note 13 above.  These measures are intended to capture
differences between urban and rural areas.  However, neither of these variables was statistically
significant, indicating that the differences in market areas between state and national banks were
not too large.
group with which to investigate the moral-hazard problem.   Because this group of banks
19
operated in some of the same market areas and over the same time periods as the state-chartered
banks, the effects of economic activity should be similar between the two groups of banks.   In
20
the absence of a moral-hazard effect, we expect the coefficient on the capitalization variable to be
either insignificant or positive.  The results from estimating the empirical model for national banks
are shown in the last column of Table 7.  For this group of banks, we only have data on total
loans.  The capitalization variable is statistically insignificant, indicating that for this group of
banks, ex-ante risk was not correlated with financial strength.  Moreover, testing for differences in
the coefficients in the model for uninsured national banks versus the comparable model for the
insured state banks indicates that the coefficients on the capital term are statistically different from
each other across the two models, as are the coeffficients on the lagged dependent variable and
bank size.  However, the coefficients on the annual dummy variables were not statistically
different between these models, indicating that economic activity affected both groups of banks in-21-
       In testing the differences in the coefficients on CAPASS   across the equations for national
21
t-1
and state banks, the value of the t-statistic is 4.6.  For differences between the coefficients on
LOANASS  the t-statistic is 3.9, and on SIZE, the t-statistic is 5.2. t-1 t
       One potential shortcoming of using loan concentration as a measure of ex-ante risk is the
22
possibility that banks, when facing financial difficulties, could elect to sell off some of their
security holdings.  In such a scenario, banks would see an increase in their loan to asset ratio
following a decline in their capitalization, but this would be unrelated to increases in risk.  To
investigate this possibility, we regressed banks’ securities holdings (as a percent of assets) on their
lagged capital to asset ratio (as well as size and the dummy variables).  No statistically significant
relationship was found between banks’ holdings of securities and prior levels of capitalization,
indicating that this type of asset restructuring was not behind the empirical results.  
a similar manner.    These results provide some evidence that for uninsured banks, moral hazard
21
was not present.   When combined with the results using data for state-chartered banks, it
22
appears that declines in financial condition gave rise to heightened asset risk.  Such a response is
consistent with moral-hazard incentives at work.  
VIII.  Conclusions
It has been well established theoretically that a fixed-rate deposit insurance system can
provide banks with moral-hazard incentives to increase risk.  Empirical verification of this
potential for increases in risk at insured institutions has been difficult to obtain, however.  In this
paper, we use data on both insured and uninsured banks in Texas during the 1920s in an attempt
to estimate whether a deterioration in financial condition at insured banks led to greater asset risk. 
Using different measures of loan concentration as our proxy for ex-ante risk, we find some
evidence that a moral-hazard effect was at work for banks covered by a deposit insurance system. 
However, using data from a sample of banks operating in the same general area and same time
period that were not covered by deposit guarantees, no significant relationship is indicated




AGLOANS Loans secured by agricultural products, live
stock, or merchandise, warehouse receipts,
etc... as a percent of ASSETS.
ASSETS Total Resources (including notes and bills
rediscounted with Federal Reserve Banks).
CAPASS Capital stock paid in, plus surplus fund, plus
all other undivided profit, as a percent of
ASSETS.
ECONOMY A vector of annual dummy variables.
LOANASS LOANS as a percent of ASSETS.
LOANS Total loans and discounts.
RELOANS Loans secured by real estate collateral,
including mortgages and stocks and bonds
issued by real estate corporations or based
upon real estate securities, as a percent of
ASSETS.
SIZE Log of ASSETS.
TROUBLED The sum of past due (six months or more)
loans and notes, plus OREO, expressed as a
percent of ASSETS.
Data Sources: Examiner’s Report of Condition, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 1919-1926. 
Annual Report, U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, 1919-1927.-23-
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Distribution of Lending Activity at Texas Banks
1919-1926
*Bars represent the mean values for each decile.
Source: Examiner's Report of Condition, 1919-1926 , Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Annual Report, Comptroller of Currency, 1919-1926.
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Ratio of Total Loans to Assets
Texas State Banks Texas National Banks
-28-Chart 3
Distribution of Agricultural and Real Estate Lending 
at Texas State Banks
1919-1926
*Bars represent the mean values for each decile.
Source: Examiner's Report of Condition, 1919-1926, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
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Bank Liquidations in Texas 
1919-1926
Year
State Banks National Banks
Liquidations Liquidations Number Liquida- Number Liquida-
of Banks tion Rate of Banks tion Rate
Voluntary Total Voluntary Involuntar Involuntar
y y Total
1919 12 3 15 907 1.65 7 0 7 543 1.29
1920 16 2 18 967 1.86 n.a 0 n.a. 543 n.a.
1921 21 22 43 1008 4.27 14 10 24 556 4.32
1922 41 35 76 998 7.62 9 2 11 557 1.97
1923 35 17 52 965 5.38 6 3 9 555 1.62
1924 24 23 47 942 4.99 5 3 8 561 1.43
1925 103 47 150 883 16.99 5 5 10 573 1.74
1926 31 33 64 808 7.92 10 1 11 642 1.71
Sources: for state banks, Grant and Crum, (1978); for national banks, Comptroller of the Currency Annual Reports, 1918-1926. 
From 1919-1922, the data for the state banks are for year-end August 31.  From 1923-1926, the data for state banks are
for year-end December 31.  For the state banks, the number of banks represents the mean of the number of banks in
operation at the beginning of the year and the number of banks in operation at the end of the year.  For national banks,
the data are for year-end October 31, and the number of banks represents the total number the previous year.  n.a. = not
available.-31-
Table 2
Cost of Deposit Guaranty Fund to Texas State Banks
Total Assessments Levied
1919-1926
Year All state banks Sample
Assessments Assessments as a Assessments Assessments as a percent
(000s of $) percent of total assets (000s of $) of total assets
1919 189 0.06 0 0.00
1920 789 0.19 5 0.03
1921 6,289 1.68 106 0.51
1922 2,168 0.66 305 1.80
1923 1,042 0.32 356 1.80
1924 2,397 0.67 338 1.64
1925 n.a. n.a. 410 2.05
1926 n.a. n.a. 321 1.68
Sources: Weaver (1926, p. 72);  Examiner’s Report of Condition, Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas, 1919-192;  All Bank Statistics United States 1986-1955, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1959.
Note: n.a. = not available.-32-
Table 3
Texas State Bank Sample Compared to State Member Bank Population
1919-1926
Year number of assets member bank
Sample Sample Total Fed state
banks (000s) assets (000s)
Total number Sample as a Sample as a
of Fed state percentage of  percentage of 
member banks Fed members total member
examined examined assets
a
1919 14 52 26.9 10,523 79,578 13.20
1920 22 68 32.4 15,379 136,019 11.30
1921 63 205 30.7 23,641 115,010 20.56
1922 54 198 27.3 22,122 108,933 20.31
1923 55 187 29.4 25,985 n.a. n.a.
1924 57 175 32.6 27,688 n.a n.a.
1925 50 130 38.5 26,446 n.a n.a.
1926 51 115 44.4 23,820 n.a. n.a.
Includes all banks in the Dallas Federal Reserve District, which at the time included parts of Arizona, Louisiana, New Mexico, and
a
Oklahoma, and all of Texas.  
Sources: Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 1919-27;  Examiner’s Report of Condition, Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas, 1919-1926.  
n.a. = not available.-33-
Table 4
National Bank Sample Compared to National Bank Population in Texas
1919-1926
Year Sample All Texas national banks Sample as a percentage of
Number Assets (000s) Number Assets (000s) Total number Total assets
1919 50 160,093 543 719,521 9.2 22.3
1920 48 139,111 556 883,067 8.6 15.8
1921 43 80,509 557 718,743 7.7 11.2
1922 42 96,246 555 729,885 7.6 13.2
1923 41 84,759 561 760,596 7.3 11.1
1924 41 97,395 573 810,250 7.2 12.0
1925 40 99,314 642 944,355 6.2 10.5
1926 39 92,892 662 969,465 5.9 9.6
Sources: All-Bank Statistics, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 1959.
Annual Report, U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, 1919-1926.-34-
Table 5
Means of Sample Variables Compared to Population
1919-1926
Variable State bank All Texas National bank All Texas
sample state banks sample national banks
Capital-to-asset ratio 19.0 18.9
(percent) (7.50) (6.9) 19.7 15.5
Loan-to-asset ratio 63.3 59.1
(percent) (13.9) (12.8) 68.1 59.1
Agricultural loans-to- 30.8
asset ratio (percent) (15.1) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Real estate loans-to- 5.5
asset ratio (percent) (5.25) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total assets (dollars) $331,455 $1,403,010 $478,632 $2,555,374
(454,834) (7,674,529)
Sources: Examiner’s Report of Condition, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 1919-1926.
Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 1919-1926.
All-Bank Statistics, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 1959.
Annual Report, Comptroller of the Currency, 1919-1926.
Notes:  The table shows standard deviations in parentheses below the means.
n.a. = not available.-35-
Table 6
Estimates of Loan Concentrations as Proxies for Ex-Ante Risk
1919-1926
Dependent Variable: TROUBLED
Independent Loan Concentration Measures
Variables
LOANASS AGLOANS RELOANS








SIZE -0.0047 -0.0035 -0.0092* t
(0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0052)
R 0.08 0.09 0.11
2
n 223 223 223
Notes: ** = statistical significance at the 1-percent level.
* =  statistical significance at the 5-percent level.
 † = statistical significance at 10-percent level.
Standard errors are in parentheses and are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White’s
(1980) procedure.  The dependent variable is expressed as a percent of assets.  See the
appendix for a complete description of the variables used.  Annual dummy variables that-36-
proxy for economic activity, and quarterly dummy variables that capture the seasonal
effects of agricultural lending activity, are not shown but are statistically significant.-37-
Table 7
Estimates of Moral Hazard 
1919-1926
Independent




LOANASS AGLOANS RELOANS LOANASS
INTERCEPT 1.1692** 0.6739** 0.0359 0.0960
(0.1682) (0.1772) (0.0649) (0.0776)
CAPASS -0.5562** -0.2089† -0.0287 0.1080 t-1
(0.1106) (0.1214) (0.0425) (0.0995)






SIZE -0.0567** -0.0421** 0.0022 0.0043 t
(0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0046) (0.0044)
R 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.52
2
n 223 223 223 258-38-
Notes: ** = statistical significance at the 1-percent level.
 † = statistical significance at 10-percent level.
Standard errors are in parentheses and are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White’s
(1980) procedure.  The dependent variables are expressed as a percent of assets.  See the
appendix for a complete description of the variables used.  Annual dummy variables that
proxy for economic activity, and quarterly dummy variables that capture the seasonal
effects of agricultural lending activity, are not shown but are statistically significant.